The EU is frequently referred to as one of the Titans of the WTO and this is why its trade disputes frequently receive a lot of attention from academics, practitioners and the media. This attention frequently arises at the later stages of the proceedings -during oral hearings, after the Panel Report or the Appellate Body Report. However, the focus of our study lies primarily on disputes which are still at the very early phase of their development. The scope of this report has required the narrowing down of the subject-matter, and the authors have concentrated on the movement of goods, covering five pending cases.
Introduction
The EU is frequently referred to as one of the Titans of the WTO and this is why its trade disputes frequently receive a lot of attention from academics, practitioners and the media. This attention frequently arises at the later stages of the proceedings -during oral hearings, after the Panel Report or the Appellate Body Report. However, the focus of our study lies primarily on disputes which are still at the very early phase of their development. The scope of this report has required the narrowing down of the subject-matter, and the authors have concentrated on the movement of goods, covering five pending cases.
First, the report covers cases where the EU is the respondent. It looks at the measures which the EU has adopted internally, examining their background and inquiring how these measures affect trade. It is generally known that EU legislation can pose barriers both to internal and to external trade, 1 and it is interesting that such legislation can be challenged both within the EU -before the European Court, or in the international arena -before WTO bodies. An example of this is the pending disputes on seals 2 and poultry. 3 Then, the report looks at measures from third countries which EU traders have considered to be obstacles to trade, and which the EU decided to challenge using the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. These cases in which the EU acts as a complainant concern India's and the Philippines' measures on spirits, 4 and China's rules on raw materials.
European Communities -certain measures prohibiting the importation and marketing of seal products

Background
Ever since the seal hunting issue was addressed in the 1980s, when the EC introduced a Directive banning the import of seal pups' fur and related products, 6 debate has not ceased.
The early beginnings of this intricate problem date from the 19 th century, when seal fishery grew as an industry as a result of technical developments. Since then, many measures have been introduced to enhance the productivity of the hunt, as well as to preserve the seal population. For instance, in 1961 the closing date for hunting was set at 5 May, and later this was brought forward to 25 April, which shortened the hunting season.
7 In 1964, certain species of seals were excluded from hunting, such as hooded seals, or all female seals on birthing patches. 8 The first quota was set at 245,000 in 1971. 9 It reached its low, a total of 127,000, in 1976, and its peak in 2003, when it amounted to 350,000.
10 Today, the quota is set near to the first one, a total of 275,000.
11 When it comes to the seal population, some claim that it has increased by 50% or even 60% in the last 30 years, 12 while others maintain quite the reverse is true.
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At the moment, the most important piece of legislation regulating this field is Canada's Marine Mammal Regulations, which forms part of the Fisheries Act, adopted in the mid 1960s.
14 It contains provisions on obligatory hunting licences, various methods of hunting that are intended to reduce to the minimum the amount of distress and pain, a ban on killing seals under 12 months of age, and procedures to be taken if quotas are breached, and so forth. The hunting closing dates are set 6 Council Directive (EEC) 83/129 of 28 March 1983 concerning the importation into Member States of skins of certain seal pups and products derived therefrom [1983] OJ L091 09/04/1983 P 0030 -0031. differently for every region. It can be concluded from the meticulousness of this regulation that Canada has great interest in the seal industry, not only because its exports in seal products reach up to $18 million (CAD), of which nearly one third goes to the EU, but also because seal fishery is the only source of income for people in regions where hunting is conducted.
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Disputed measure
Belgium and the Netherlands were the first EU Member States to introduce bans on the importation, transportation, manufacturing, marketing and sale of seal products. This stimulated a Europe-wide discussion and opinion polls on seal hunting which were supposed to lead to a decision on whether to regulate these issues at the EU level. 16 When in 2007 Canada requested consultations with the European Communities concerning these national measures, one might have assumed that the challenge would make the European legislature reluctant to adopt a piece of Community legislation on the matter. 17 It is thus very interesting that despite Canada's challenge to national bans on seal products, the European Community still adopted Regulation No 1007/2009 on trade in seal products. 18 This resulted in another request for consultations by Canada, 19 and soon afterwards by Norway and Iceland. According to its preamble, the Regulation was adopted to protect animal welfare by banning seal products altogether. 21 On the other hand, the Regulation bears in mind that seal hunting has been a part of the culture and a means of survival for the Inuit, an indigenous people residing in the Arctic and sub-Arctic area. 22 Hence, the Regulation allows only seal products that result from hunting traditionally conducted by the Inuit. 23 Nevertheless, the Inuit communities complain since the price, for instance, of seal fur has plummeted almost tenfold since the ban was introduced.
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Possible breach of WTO law
The main position of the complainants is that the European Communities failed to meet their obligations under the WTO; namely Articles I:1 (Most Favoured Nation Treatment), III:4 (National Treatment) and XI:1 (Import Restrictions) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), as well as Articles 2.1 (National Treatment and Most Favoured Nation Treatment) and 2.2 (on technical regulations which should not be unnecessary obstacles to international trade) of the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement -TBT.
Regarding compliance with the GATT, an important issue in this case is firstly whether the ban in question is applied 'so as to afford protection' to domestic production. While the measure is imposed on all seal products, regardless of their country of origin, it should be noted that from the EU's point of view, the majority of seal products are in fact foreign, coming from Newfoundland, Eastern Quebec and Nunavut, where seal hunting forms an essential part of the economy.
25 Consequently, some argue 26 that the measure at hand is probably protectionist, especially when one takes into consideration that the EU has focused solely on seals (and the related industry), while at the same time it encourages, for example, the highly industrialised and inhumane breeding of livestock. Moreover, certain 'hypocritical' arguments are often raised against the EU, such as the fact that in France, for instance, there is no guarantee that sheep are not conscious while they are slaughtered, 28 or the fact that every four to five days more animals are killed for fur in Europe than seals in Canada in one year. 29 Another question raised when it comes to discrimination is whether the products in question can be considered as 'like', since Article III:4 GATT prohibits different treatment of such products. According to Regulation No 1007/2009, 30 seal products are differentiated on the basis of the process and production methods (PPMs). In other words, the ban on trade does not apply to seal products derived from traditional Inuit hunts, where the use of a hakapik 31 in a special manner assures the painless treatment of seals.
32 Although in some cases, such as Tuna/ Dolphin, it is stated that the PPMs are irrelevant for determining the 'likeness' of products, 33 more recent tests of likeness, such as those based on the regulatory purpose, suggest that PPMs can be taken into account.
34
But even if the case was decided on the basis on Article XI GATT and not Article III GATT, the measure might still be justified. In Shrimp/Turtle, dealing with the US import ban on shrimps caught with techniques resulting in the incidental killing of sea turtles, both the Panel and the Appellate Body in the case determined that justifications from Article XX GATT can be invoked (although the US measure was not justified as it was contrary to the chapeau of Article XX constituting unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail). 35 Secondly, it is questionable whether the measure at hand is necessary in the context of Article 2.2 TBT which provides that 28 In Canada, the aforementioned Marine Mammal Regulations provide this guarantee. 29 Surprisingly enough, the Regulation itself addresses this question. According to its preamble, the reason behind the ban lies in the impossibility to establish an effective mechanism to control the treatment of seals in the production process. 37 On the other hand, the complainants claim the exact opposite -that simple labelling would achieve the goal, an option that is completely overruled by the Regulation. 38 Since both parties firmly defend their standpoints, it seems that this issue will be vigorously argued and supported by evidence from both sides.
Finally, the EU could invoke the protection of public morals, animal life and health, or even the conservation of exhaustible natural resources 39 as a defence. While the basic connection between the ban and the set goals is more or less clear, what still remains vague is how the exemption for Inuit hunters 40 contributes to the protection of animal life or the conservation of exhaustible natural resources. Furthermore, the fact that the breach of TBT is an issue in this case might result in an analysis of its relation to Article XX of the GATT. In fact, it seems that it would be possible for the EU to use not only the justifications set out in Article XX, but any other ones (not only because Article III:4 GATT can be interpreted in a way that products which can be differentiated on the basis of any legitimate regulatory purpose are not 'like', 41 but also because the list of justifications in Article 2.2 of the TBT is inexhaustible). However, in the latter case, the justification of the Regulation should be supported by scientific evidence as well. 
Other parallel procedures
It seems that the complaining party is attempting to devalue the necessity of the Regulation twofold. Firstly, the hunting communities are proposing the adoption of the Universal Declaration on the Ethical Harvest of Seals 42 ('We Care'). According to their public announcement, their aim is to establish a common international position on ethical standards for the seal harvest, to adopt national codes of ethics and certification of hunting practices and even to have a United Nations Universal Declaration on the Ethical Seal Harvest ratified. 43 Secondly, the Canadian Inuit 44 lodged a lawsuit before the European General Court for the annulment of the EC Regulation in question. 45 At first, the Court temporarily suspended the ban in order to properly consider the legal challenge. 46 However, this interim injunction applied only to seal hunters who are parties in this case, which induced a wave of dissatisfaction among other Canadian hunters. Most recently, the Court reached a completely different decision. When it assessed the interim measure, it concluded that the applicants' arguments on severe financial damage and the risk of suicide among youths in Inuit communities cannot be accepted. In other words, the Court, after all, introduced a total ban until it decides on the legality of the prohibition altogether. 47 Perhaps this period before the Court's final decision will show whether the ban truly endangers the Inuit communities, therefore anticipating the final outcome of this dispute.
The main position of the Inuit communities is that the European Parliament and Council erred in law when using Article 114 TFEU (Approximation of laws in the field of the internal market) as the basis for adopting the Regulation in question, that the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality were infringed and, finally, that they were denied their rights under Article 8 (Right to respect private and family life), read in the light of Article 9 (Freedom of thought, conscience and religion) and Article 10 (Freedom of expression) of ECHR, Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR (Right to property), as well as their right to be heard. 48 All of the above sheds new light on this dispute -it seems that a balance among three different grounds -EU law, WTO law and international law -is necessary in order to find a solution. In addition, taking into account the estimated duration of the dispute of three years and the cost of $10 million, Canada will certainly have to put in a great deal of effort to save a $7 million industry.
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European Communities -certain measures affecting poultry meat and poultry meat products from the United States
Background
The dispute dates back to 1997, when the EU first banned the use of pathogen reduction treatments (PRTs) on poultry. 50 It prohibited the trade of poultry that was treated with any substance other than water unless such a substance had been approved by the EU. This was a problem for US manufacturers as many other treatments of poultry were approved by the US federal government and routinely used in US chicken and turkey plants. Consequently, in 2002, the United States asked the EU to approve the use of four PRTs on poultry destined for export there: chlorine dioxide, acidified sodium chlorate, trisodium phosphate, and peroxyacids. 51 However, the EU rejected the approval of these substances for poultry treatment.
52 It had also not published or otherwise made available the process of approving a substance.
It is worth mentioning that the EU measures caused a significant decrease in poultry trade between the two countries. Prior to 1997, when the prohibition took effect, US exports of broiler and turkey meat to the 15 countries that then constituted the EU were reported to total nearly 32,000 MT with a value of $44.4 million. 53 Now that the EU consists of 
The disputed measure
The main disputed measure which prohibits the treatment of poultry with any substance other than water (unless approved by the EU) is Regulation (EC) 853/2004, 57 namely Article 3(2). The Article reads, as follows:
Food business operators shall not use any substance other than potable water -or, when Regulation (EC) No 852/2004 or this Regulation permits its use, clean water -to remove surface contamination from products of animal origin, unless use of the substance has been approved in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 12(2).
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One should immediately notice that this measure does not differentiate between domestic (from EU countries) and imported (from third countries) poultry, since its addressees are all food business operators, without reference to their origin. Although applied in the same manner to both domestic and imported products, these measures can still have negative impacts on trade. The measure at hand defines poultry by the process and production methods. Poultry treated in a different manner (with substances other than water) is not even considered poultry from the EU law point of view. 59 On the other hand, as US food business operators mainly produce poultry using PRTs, it is impossible for them to export to the EU, since, according to the mentioned EU definition of poultrymeat, they do not export poultrymeat. This causes a heavier burden on US food business operators, as they must take supplementary measures to comply with 54 Johnson and Becker (n 50) 2. 55 1. "poultrymeat" means: poultrymeat suitable for human consumption, which has not undergone any treatment other than cold treatment to ensure its preservation'. the EU rules. One might argue that the measure was introduced 'so as to afford protection to domestic production' and that it is thus contrary to Article III GATT (national treatment). However, the US does not argue this, perhaps since already in the Tuna/Dolphin cases 60 PPMs were characterised as not falling within this GATT provision.
The US is also disputing the following measures: Article 6 of the
Possible breach of WTO law
The complainant contends that the above-mentioned documents show inconsistency with the following WTO obligations: ve of minimising trade impact); Article 8 SPS (on control, inspection, and approval procedures aimed at treating imports no less favourably than domestic products); and Annex C (1) (on control, inspection and approval procedures for products to comply with sanitary and phytosanitary measures); -Article X:1 GATT (which sets forth the obligation to publish trade regulations); Article XI:1 GATT (which enshrines the general elimination of quantitative restrictions); -Article 4.2 of the Agricultural Agreement (which brings about a prohibition of resort to border measures other than customs duties); -Article 2 TBT (which is also intended to ensure that TBT measures do not discriminate against imports or create unjustified barriers to trade).
It is worth specially addressing the US claim that the measure is contrary to Articles 2.2 and 5 SPS, as both articles prevent even nonprotectionist measures (which are in some other way irrational). In Japan -Agricultural Products 63 and Japan -Apples, 64 the Appellate Body interpreted Article 2.2 providing for the obligation of states not to maintain SPS measures without sufficient scientific evidence as requiring 'a rational or objective relationship between the SPS measure and the scientific evidence' which 'is to be determined on a case-by-case basis and will depend upon the particular circumstances of the case, including the characteristics of the measure at issue and the quality and quantity of the scientific evidence'. 65 Concerning Article 5 SPS in EC-Hormones, the Appellate Body interpreted Article 5 (particularly 5.1) as requiring that measures based on a higher level of protection than the relevant international standard would have done had to be based on a risk assessment. 66 The US in this case argues that this measure lacks scientific evidence. To uphold its assertions, the US made use of scientific opinion published by EFSA (European Food Safety Authority) on 2 April 2008, which found that 'there are currently no published data to conclude in whatever way' that these substances, when applied to poultry carcasses, 
China -measures related to the exportation of various raw materials
Background of the case
For several years China has been imposing certain restrictions on the export of certain raw materials. China is one of the largest extractors and exporters of the raw materials in question which can rarely be found elsewhere. These raw materials are essential to many globally traded products, from cell phones to toothpaste. The most frequent argument used against China is that it is trying to benefit its own manufacturers. This can be seen from the effect of these measures -the prices on its internal market remain artificially low, while the rest of the world struggles with high prices, or even stagnation and job loss.
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Although this issue has been raised in numerous attempts at negotiation, China has not changed its practice. As a result, the European Communities requested consultations with China under the WTO, regarding 32 measures through which China is restraining exports. 71 At the same time, the United States also lodged a request, and Mexico soon followed. 72 The dispute has drawn the attention of other WTO members, consequently amounting to a long list of third parties -Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Norway, Chinese Taipei, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. 73 Finally, a Panel has been composed.
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Disputed measure
China has applied export restrictions, in the form of export quotas and export duties, on certain raw materials such as bauxite, coke, fluorspar, silicon carbide, zinc, yellow phosphorus and others. 75 In addition, China has imposed additional requirements related to the export of the said materials. Such measures, which number at least 32 in total, include: restricting the right to export on the basis of prior export experience; establishing criteria that foreign-invested enterprises must satisfy in order to export that are different from those that domestic entities must satisfy; requiring exporters to pay fees; maintaining a minimum export price system and requiring the examination and approval of export contracts and export prices.
76
Possible breach of WTO law
The complainants argue that the Chinese measures breach the GATT provisions which prohibit overburdening fees and formalities connected with imports and exports (Article VIII GATT) as well as non-pecuniary restrictions on trade (Article XI GATT), and which impose an obligation regarding the publication and administration of trade regulations (Article X GATT), and that the measures breach the Protocol on the Accession of the People' ) . Furthermore, the complaining parties argue that the measures imposed also nullify or impair the benefits accrued under these agreements.
In response, China argues that its export duties are necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, or, in other words, that they are justified under Article XX(b) of the GATT. 85 China's aim is to decrease primary production (production from raw materials in crude ores) because such production is less environmentally friendly than secondary production. 86 Increased secondary production, which is a consequence of reducing primary production, will lead to a reduction in health risks associated with primary production.
87 Against this, the complainants submit that China has failed to establish that the measures in question actually achieve the set aim.
88 Furthermore, the complainants suggest China -Raw Materials (n 85).
87
China -Raw Materials (n 85). 88 China -Raw Materials (n 85).
that the set aim might have been achieved by other means, for instance by various restrictions on the extraction of raw materials. 89 Regardless of the plausibility of these lines of argument, it is still questionable whether Article XX can be applied at all. To be more exact, China seems to be in breach of not only the GATT but its Accession Protocol as well. In order to fully assess the issue, it should first be determined what role the Accession Protocol has in the present case, as well as in WTO law. Unlike any other accession protocol, China's Accession Protocol is not standardised. 90 In other words, it is quite unique since it offers a different set of trade rules which elaborate, expand, modify or deviate from the existing WTO agreements. 91 According to paragraph 1.2 of the Accession Protocol, when it comes to China's trade, the Protocol forms an integral part of the WTO agreement. 92 The latter was confirmed by the Panel in China -Automobile Parts. 93 On the one hand, the provisions that impose stronger obligations on China than other WTO Agreements -the so-called 'WTO-Plus' obligations 94 -are particularly relevant for this case because they are the provisions that China seems to be in breach of. In fact, paragraphs 5.1, 5.2 and 8.3 of the Accession Protocol correspond to Article III of the GATT (National Treatment), but while Article III deals with goods, the aforementioned paragraphs 95 address the national treatment of foreign persons and their trading opportunities. Hence, the Accession Protocol is in certain ways broader than the GATT in terms of national treatment, to the extent that its scope encompasses not only goods but also the persons who are trading in those goods. 96 Although at first glance such a conclusion does not predict an outcome to the dispute, it should be noted that in China -Publications and Audiovisual Products 97 both the Panel and the Appellate Body concluded that China had not violated the GATT, but that it violated its Accession Protocol. On the other hand, the Accession Protocol is to some extent narrower. 98 Its paragraph 11.3
requires that China eliminates all export taxes and charges, 99 except those for the 84 products listed in Annex 6. These products may be subject to export duties up to a maximum rate as specified in the Annex. In the present case, the majority of the raw materials are not listed, while for others the export duty rates are set higher than agreed. The question raised in this issue is whether China can use Article XX of the GATT to justify the measures that are in breach of the Accession Protocol, or, more generally, whether Article XX can be invoked to provide exemption from the obligations of the accession instruments or other agreements.
The earlier case law has not given a clear-cut answer. For instance, in China -Audiovisual Products, the Appellate Body found that 'China may rely upon the introductory clause of paragraph 5.1 of its Accession Protocol and seek to justify the contested provisions as necessary to protect public morals in China, within the meaning of Article XX(a) of the GATT'. 100 In the Report in US -Shrimp (Thailand) and US -Customs Bond Directive, 101 the Appellate Body first concluded that for the sake of argument it should be assumed that there was a possibility to apply Article XX of the GATT as a justification for breaching other agreements (in the cases at hand, the Anti-Dumping Agreement was in question).
102 But, after finding that the measures in question did not meet the conditions of Article XX, the Appellate Body decided it was superfluous to determine whether Article XX could have been invoked in the first place.
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Taking into consideration both of the paths that the Panel and the Appellate Body may take in the present case, it is difficult to see whether the outcome of this dispute will significantly contribute to WTO law in relation to the applicability of Article XX outside the GATT.
India -certain taxes and other measures on imported wines and spirits and the Philippines -taxes on distilled spirits
Background
India, being one of the largest markets in the world, is an attractive destination for exports, and the same is true for the export of spirits from the EU. The Indian market for spirits is one of the largest in the world, amounting in 2007 to about 130 million nine-litre cases. 104 The corresponding figure for wine is 1.5 million nine-litre cases. 105 However, trade in spirits has been affected by measures adopted by several Indian states, including Maharashtra, Goa, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Andhra Prandesh. After the introduction of their measures, EU exports to India dropped dramatically. In 2007, EU exports of spirits to India amounted to about €57 million (out of a total €7 billion exported to more than 150 countries). 106 However, in 2008 107 these figures dropped to €52 million. 108 Concerning trade in wine in particular, in 2007 EU exports to India amounted to about €11 million (out of a total €6 billion for its global exports), 109 and in 2008 exports decreased to €8 million).
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As part of its 2007 Market Access Strategy, the European Commission has focused new resources on removing unfair barriers to trade in key growing markets such as India. 111 The EU claims that such barriers hamper access to the Indian market of EU bottled wines and spirits. On 22 September 2008, the EU requested consultations with India regarding the above-mentioned measures. The EU is involved in another factually similar dispute with the Philippines. The EU argues that the tax system of the Philippines has prevented EU exporters from fully participating in the Philippine market of alcoholic beverages, which has seen steady growth in recent years. 114 While sales of local spirits have grown by over 8% since 2005, overall sales of imported spirits have actually declined during the same period. 115 From 2004 to 2007, EU exports of spirits to the Philippines fell from around €37 million to €18 million. 116 EU Trade Commissioner Catherine Ashton pointed out that '[t]his long-running problem has prevented EU exporters from competing fairly in the Philippine market, and has led to a sharp decrease in imports of European spirits'. 117 On 29 July 2009, the EU requested consultations with the Philippines 118 and on 10 December the EU requested the establishment of a panel.
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The disputed measures
The disputed Indian measures consist in particular of the following:
-the Indian states of Andhra Prandesh, Maharashtra and Karnataka subject imported bottled wines to taxation in excess of domestic like products. Maharashtra also applies a prohibited subsidy by exempting from 'excise duty' its local wines made from local grapes; -in the Indian State of Tamil Nadu, imported spirits are burdened with a 'special fee on the import of excisable articles'. 120 Imported spirits are excessively taxed, hence the measure constituting de jure discrimination.
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Furthermore, the EU is also challenging a non-fiscal measure introduced by the Tamil Nadu State which restricts the wholesale and retail distribution of imported bottled wines and spirits. The contested measu-114 'EU requests WTO consultations with the Philippines over unfair taxation of spirits' EU-ROPA Press Releases Rapid re was introduced in the Tamil Nadu Liquor (Licence and Permit) Rules, 1981, as amended in 2008. 122 The import of liquor in Tamil Nadu is prohibited. 123 With Rule XI-B, 124 the Tamil Nadu State Market Corporation was granted the exclusive privilege of supplying by wholesale and selling by retail imported wines and spirits from outside India. Later, Tamil Nadu amended the challenged discriminatory restrictions on the wholesale and retail distribution of imported bottled wines and spirits.
125 Despite this, indications that de facto discrimination may still occur put this Indian state under close monitoring.
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-Karnataka State applies the 'additional special fee', which subjects imported wines to internal taxes in excess of domestic like products.
The disputed Philippine measure concerns Section 141 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 which establishes an excise tax regime which the EU argues adversely affects imports of distilled spirits.
127
In essence, under this regime, distilled spirits produced from the sap of nipa, coconut, cassava, camote or buri palm, or from the juice, syrup or sugar of the cane, provided that such materials are produced commercially in the country where they are processed into distilled spirits, are 128 These raw materials are indigenous to the Philippines. At the same time, imported spirits produced from other raw materials are subject to a system of price bands at substantially higher tax rates (between 126 and 504 pesos in 2009).
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Possible breach of WTO law
Both cases deal with an alleged breach of Article III GATT, containing the national treatment principle. Article III:1 articulates a general principle that internal measures should not be applied 'so as to afford protection to domestic production'. This general principle informs the rest of Article III. 130 We will first analyse the possible breach of Article III:2, and then of Article III:4.
In both India -Alcohol and Philippines -Alcohol, the EU argues that there is a breach of Article III:2, ie that fiscal measures breach the national treatment principle. In factually similar cases, Japan -Alcohol 131 and Chile -Alcohol 132 (where the Appellate Body clarified Japan -Alcohol in paragraphs 62 and 71 of the report), the Appellate Body looked at the measures' protectionist purpose -not the purpose in the sense of the subjective intention of the legislators, but at the 'the purpose or objectives of a Member's legislature and government as a whole', since these are pertinent 'to the extent that they are given objective expression in the statute itself'. 133 Consequently, 'a measure's purposes, objectively manifested in the design, architecture and structure of the measure, are intensely pertinent to the task of evaluating whether or not that measure is applied so as to afford protection to domestic production'. 134 Further, in its report in Japan -Alcohol, the Appellate Body held that examining whether a national measure was consistent with Article III:2, first sentence, meant examining only two elements -one being 'likeness' and the second being the fact whether national taxes were applied to imported products 'in excess of' those applied to domestic ones. 135 objective characteristics of the product to one based solely on the legitimate regulatory purpose), it seems that the Philippines and India will have a hard time proving that the products concerned are not like (especially when they differentiate between distilled spirits on the basis of the raw materials used as in the earlier cases of US -Malt Beverages, 136 and Japan -Alcohol). The Philippines could, however, claim that these products are not like as they are differentiated on the basis of physical characteristics. The second element, that the national taxes are applied to imported products 'in excess of' those applied to domestic ones, can easily be seen in the measure itself, where the tax rates of the products vary from 11.65 pesos to 125 and even 265 pesos per proof litre. If this dispute settlement process reaches the Panel phase, the Panel would without much doubt apply the previous conclusions.
In India -Alcohol, the EU also claims that there is a breach of Article III:4, presumably by Tamil Nadu State which restricts the wholesale and retail distribution of imported bottled wines and spirits. For a measure to be in breach of Article III:4, it has to treat 'like products' less favourably, so as to afford protection to domestic production. Regarding 'likeness', one needs to bear in mind that this concept is not the same as the one mentioned in Article III:2, first sentence. The term should be interpreted more broadly than the term in Article III:2, first sentence, but more narrowly than the concept of Article III:2 as a whole, encompassing 'like products' and 'directly competitive or substitutable'. 137 But since Tamil Nadu's measure expressly differentiates between these products solely on the criterion of origin, it can be stated without doubt that they are to be treated as 'like' products. Concerning treatment 'less favourable so as to afford protection to domestic production', one needs to analyse the protectionist purpose of the disputed measure. As the Appellate Body stated in Korea-Beef, 138 in order for a measure to be deemed to treat imported products less favourably, it should be assessed whether the measure in question modifies the conditions of competition in the relevant market to the detriment of imported products. As mentioned above, the Tamil Nadu State Market Corporation was granted the exclusive privilege of supplying by wholesale and selling by retail imported wines and spirits from outside India. Such a situation distorts competition conditions in the following way: foreign producers cannot access the Tamil Nadu market unless the Tamil Nadu State Market Corporation decides to purchase foreign liquor from them. The EU contends that the wholesale and retail of imported wines and spirits for general sale have de facto been denied in Tamil Nadu. 139 On the other hand, domestic liquor producers can access their market by simply obtaining a licence, as regulated by the Tamil Nadu Liquor (licence and permit) Rules. 140 If one was to apply the reasoning given in Korea -Beef, 141 the disputed Tamil Nadu measure would be found in breach of Article III:4. India, regarding this particular measure, might attempt to justify it by asserting that the products were not 'like'. Article III:4 GATT can be interpreted in a way that products which can be differentiated on the basis of any legitimate regulatory purpose are not 'like'. 142 India's claims would be very weak, as the disputed measure is origin-specific. 143 It remains doubtful that behind this origin-specific measure there is an origin-neutral purpose. Nevertheless, it is possible that India seeks recourse to Article XX derogations. 144 The protection of morals, or human life or health, could have been invoked as a justification. Nevertheless, for a measure to be saved by Article XX derogation, it should not be 'applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade'. 145 Hence, the prohibition of the wholesale and retail of alcohol should have been applied to both domestic and imported spirits. Therefore, it seems that India would remain unsuccessful, as the contested measures expressly differentiate between domestic and imported spirits, thus constituting unjustifiable discrimination.
Concluding remarks
For everyone specialising in EU law and policy, it is interesting to see how far the EU is present and active in the international arena.
Those specialising in the internal dimension of EU law (eg in internal market law) can find it useful to see in practical examples how EU legislation and its decision-making process can have external trade effects. In general, studies show that the single market has facilitated both the EU's internal and external trade 146 (and one can assume that this has mostly been due to mutual recognition and to partial harmonisation which have made it easier for products to be marketed throughout the EU). However, the EU's positive integration can also create obstacles to trade -either because of the complex nature of the EU's decision-making process or because of the adopted outcome of legislation. On the one hand, the process of decision-making itself may be responsible for creating trade barriers as, for example, was the case in the EC -Biotech 147 dispute which largely arose due to the fact that EU Member States have different attitudes towards GMOs. 148 On the other hand, it is not only the legislative process that can cause obstacles to trade, but the legislative outcome as well. Harmonisation can bring about rules which are more trade restrictive than rules which had previously existed in most Member States (regulatory peaks 149 ). This is the situation in the current disputes on seals and poultry.
For others interested in the EU's external relations or in international trade, it can be equally interesting to see which markets EU traders are trying to penetrate and what kind of obstacles other WTO members have raised. The cases concerning India's and the Philippines' measures on spirits and China's rules on raw materials are among these, and it will be intriguing to follow their development.
